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a number have been honoured with local, provincial and national awards. 
Elinor Barr concludes that “Swedes in Canada today, both immigrants and 
descendants, are living in an era in which they can be openly proud of their 
heritage. There is no need to be invisible any longer” (269).
Swedes in Canada combines passion with academic stringency. Its fifteen 
chapters cover topics as diverse as the history of emigration from Sweden, the 
two world wars, earning a living, “Swedishness” in Canada, language, dis-
crimination and assimilation, and emerging visibility. One half of the study 
comprises detailed endnotes and appendices, a comprehensive bibliography, 
and two indexes (personal names and a general index). Swedes in Canada 
contains photographs from archives and personal collections, as well as ex-
tracts from personal letters and published sources such as novels and short 
stories written by immigrants in their own language as well as in English.
Elinor Barr’s study is the first of its kind. It is eloquently written, beauti-
fully illustrated and an important source of inspiration for all interested in 
what it meant to be a Swede in Canada in the early days of the country’s 
existence and up to the 1970s. The universities of Canada and the various 
Swedish societies in different parts of the country have an important role to 
play in ensuring that the Swedish presence remains not only strong but also 
clearly visible. Elinor Barr’s study is an important step in this direction.
Jane Mattisson Ekstam Kristianstad University, Sweden
Thomas Fleming, The Great Divide: The Conflict between Washington 
and Jefferson that Defined a Nation. Da Capo Press, 2015. ISBN: 978-
0306821271
A book about the conflict between George Washington and Thomas Jeffer-
son is overdue, says Thomas Fleming. “Numerous historians have explored 
Jefferson’s clash with Alexander Hamilton. But little has been written about 
the differences that developed between the two most famous founding fa-
thers” (1). Those differences, as the subtitle states, “defined a nation.”
Washington, we are told, was “first, last, and always a realist.” He ad-
mixed his realism with a strong faith in America’s destiny. Jefferson, in 
contrast, saw things through “the lens of a pervasive idealism.” Men, freed 
of the yoke of coercive government, would invariably find good govern-
ment, if only given inspirational “visionary words” (2).
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Manner of exposition is throughout fluid, engaging, and accessible. Flem-
ing is a talented writer and story-teller, who has a knack for knowing which 
stories to tell when developing his thesis. That said, readers wishing for an 
even-handed approach to the conflict will be enormously disappointed.
Fleming paints a vivid picture of Washington as an intrepid, resolute gen-
eral, with “honest zeal” and flexibility sufficient to abandon faulty or failing 
military schemes, and aims to show that the virtues that defined his general-
ship—he wrote “bold letters” to the Continental Congress that admonished 
them for thinking patriotism and not strategy would win “a long and bloody 
war” (69)—were the same virtues that defined his presidency. Washing-
ton’s plan to visit New England as president, Fleming says, was doubtless 
motivated by what Washington learned as general of the Continental Army: 
Share the camp and hardships with the soldiers and deal personally with 
problems of discipline and morale as they surfaced (70). And then there 
is Washington’s goodness. Fleming tells the brief story of six-years-old 
Washington Irving, meeting Washington, receiving a pat on the head, and 
that incident (presumably) leading to Irving’s brilliant biography of the first 
president (70).
Yet much of the results of Washington’s “honest zeal” as president, if we 
follow Fleming’s account carefully, is due to capable advisors like James 
Madison and take-charge members of his cabinet like Alexander Hamil-
ton, who did much to define the economic and even political direction of 
Washington’s administration. (Fleming carefully eschews mention of Jef-
ferson’s contributions to the success of the administration—e.g., his reports 
on French treaties, on commerce of America with foreign countries, and on 
coinage, weights, and measures.) Thus, Fleming’s Washington qua politi-
cian, intentions notwithstanding, comes across as more of a figurehead than 
a president with a vibrant and clear vision of his nation. Jefferson—“that 
most troublesome of politicians—an ideologue” (186)—is consistently de-
picted as a craven, duplicitous, and hypocritical castle-builder.
When Jefferson was governor of Virginia and the commander in chief of 
the militia and British forces headed into Virginia in 1780, Jefferson was 
not to be found rallying Virginians “with words as stirring as those he wrote 
in the Declaration of Independence” (21). Jefferson, it seems, was a cow-
ard. Fleming cites numerous instances of Jefferson’s duplicity. Jefferson 
allowed others to praise him for his actions apropos of the acquisition of 
the Louisiana lands, when he did nothing. The acquisition was not due to 
any shrewdness on Jefferson’s part, but to fortuitousness. France’s mount-
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ing debts during war, the French military debacle in Santo Domingo due to 
plague, and Napoleon’s need of money to maintain his military campaigns 
led to the selling of the lands (306–21). Are we to believe that Jefferson’s 
foreign policy vis-à-vis France had no bearing? Did not Jefferson refuse, 
for instance, to loan one million dollars to Napoleon for his campaign in 
Santo Domingo? Again, at a celebratory dinner honoring the administration 
for the purchase the band played “Jefferson’s March,” which Fleming says 
was “a trifle ‘monarchical’” (318). Jefferson, it seems, was again duplici-
tous for not having quieted the band.
Fleming also writes of Madison’s duplicity—Madison drafted Wash-
ington’s annual message to Congress and chaired the committee that re-
sponded to it, while he was writing essays in Freneau’s National Gazette 
that condemned Hamilton’s policies. Madison was mostly “an honorable 
and honest man,” but “the best explanation for his becoming two-faced in 
his relationship to President Washington may well be Thomas Jefferson’s 
role in the Congressman’s political and personal life” (111). Jefferson, the 
snake, had poisoned Madison.
Finally, Fleming mentions President Jefferson’s celebrated dinners with 
congressmen. Those with fellow republicans were for the sake of “subtly—
and sometimes not so subtly” telling them “how he wanted them to vote on 
various matters” (327). It is certain that that is sometimes what happened, 
Fleming’s account treats it as the only motive and it strongly suggests in-
sidious, coercive measures.
There are numerous distortions or corruptions of texts for the sake of 
slanting. Consider Fleming’s account of a dinner engagement at Jefferson’s 
residence in the nation’s capital with Alexander Hamilton and John Ad-
ams. The source, which Fleming ignores, is a letter of Jefferson to Benja-
min Rush (16 Jan. 1811). Jefferson tells Rush of a conversation that turned 
to political ideals. Adams stated that the British constitution would be the 
most perfect, if some of its defects were corrected. Hamilton asserted that 
the British constitution was “the most perfect government that ever existed” 
(the quote actually reads, “It was the most perfect model of government 
that could be formed”) even with its corruptions. Jefferson took Hamilton’s 
words, says Fleming, as “a veritable confession of his admiration for the 
ruthless men and evil deeds that would eventually snuff out all traces of 
liberty in the mother country” (109).
Yet Jefferson also in the letter to Rush mentions a second incident at the 
dinner engagement. Jefferson’s room had numerous paintings of famous 
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men, including Bacon, Locke, and Newton—“The three greatest men the 
world had ever produced,” adds Jefferson. Hamilton incredulously did not 
recognize any of the three. In brown study, Hamilton paused and added that 
he thought Julius Caesar was the greatest man who ever lived. Jefferson 
sums, “Hamilton, honest as a man, but, as a politician, believing in the 
necessity of either force or corruption to govern men.” In sum, Fleming 
depicts Jefferson as a paranoid ideologue, when the letter gives no evidence 
of that.
Again, consider Fleming’s skewed account Jay’s Treaty. After consulting 
with Secretary of State Randolph, President Washington decided to keep 
the treaty from the presses, for the perceived clamor of the citizenry would 
have made it impossible for the Senate “to consider it objectively.” Once 
the treaty was ratified, Washington then “decided it was time to listen to 
the voice of the people,” as there was “no longer any need for secrecy.” 
Fleming acknowledges that “there was an explosion of fury from North to 
Sought and East to West” once the treaty was made public (208). Is this not 
a barefaced instance of Washington’s duplicity?
Furthermore, when Genet captured a British ship The Little Sarah and 
intended to use it as a warship, Secretary Jefferson, Fleming says, was 
nowhere to be found. Concerning his absence, he sent Washington a note 
in which he complained of a fever. The note, Fleming insists, is Jeffer-
son mocking Washington for the president’s “bouts of fever.” Fleming then 
accuses Jefferson of projection, because Jefferson writes in his Anas that 
Washington wished his cabinet would have decided to fire on The Little 
Sarah, though he would not have made such a decision himself (171). Why 
the statement is projection and cannot be taken at face value is unclear.
Moreover, Fleming discusses with sang froid the Alien and Sedition Acts 
of the Adams’s administration as if they were needed measures for a country 
presumably about to be invaded by France (259–67). There is conveniently 
little discussion that the Sedition Act had the consequence of incarcerating 
many prominent republicans, including Benjamin Franklin Bache, editor of 
the Aurora, and Matthew Lyon, congressman from Vermont and author of a 
“seditious” article in the Vermont Journal. Were all such outspoken critics 
of the Adams’s administration in cahoots with the French government to 
overthrow the nation?
Chapters 25 to 33 concern events after the death of Washington. Thus, 
they do little to develop or support Fleming’s thesis. They are mostly com-
posed to denigrate Jefferson. For instance, chapter 26 begins with Jeffer-
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son’s description of his presidency as “the Revolution of 1800,” a stark 
revelation of his “envy of George Washington” (288). Chapters 30, 31, and 
32 show that the failures that defined Jefferson’s second term are character-
istic of Jefferson’s capabilities as president. Fleming writes of the man as a 
dying duck, not a lame duck. “Well before the end of his second term, [Jef-
ferson] virtually withdrew from the duties and responsibilities of his high 
office. He shipped his books and furniture back to Monticello and wrote 
self-pitying letters to his daughter Martha” (366).
At book’s end, readers are left asking themselves this: What exactly was 
the conflict between Washington and Jefferson that “defined a nation”? 
Given that Fleming notes often that Washington sided politically with Jef-
ferson at least as much as he did with Hamilton, it is difficult to believe that 
there were key axial political differences between the two. Yet the parting 
paragraph of chapter 32 is suggestive. Fleming says that Jefferson, “deeply 
conflicted man,” was a quixotic, head-in-the-clouds prophet. Washington, 
in contrast, was a leader with a real vision. “Like [Washington], our great-
est presidents have valued the visionary side of our heritage, but resisted 
the demands and pretensions of ideologies as well as the envies and angers 
of party politics [characteristic of Jefferson]” (367). Such parting words, 
prior to the final chapter explicating Madison’s defection to Washingtonian 
politics, depict greatly different (and, in Fleming’s hands, greatly skewed) 
characters; they do not describe or point to any particular conflict. Thus, 
readers are left befuddled.
In contrast to the avowed conflict between Washington and Jefferson, 
the political tensions between Hamilton and Jefferson were profound and 
caused by antagonistic visions of the budding American nation—e.g., thick 
versus thin government, Anglophilia versus Francophilia, and commercial 
urbanism versus georgic Arcadianism. That conflict was the conflict that 
defined America.
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